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NOTES AND COMMENT
another theory which has been adopted in other jurisdictions, namely,
where the municipality knowingly permits such nuisance to exist
in a park or in any other place where it is likely to cause injury,
there should be no exemption from liability to the municipality. 46
This contention is also supported in the case of Cleveland v. Ferrando,47 similar to the case at bar on all fours. It was held there
"that in failing to remove the explosive that was left on the ground
with knowledge of the same and of its dangerous character the
municipality should be held liable. The presence of an unguarded,
unexploded bomb in a public park where children are invited to come
is in itself an intolerable nuisance and so self-evident that any argument can but echo the statement." At any rate, the rule 48 adopted
in the other non-liability jurisdictions seems to be the more logical
and just, as well as the more favorable to public policy.
IRVING L, KALISH.

RIGHT OF PRIVACY-CIVIL RIGHTS LAW,

§§50, 51.

During the last half century, courts of jurisprudence have generally been reluctant to recognize the existence of the so-called right
of privacy as an individual and personal right.' This behavior on the
part of the courts may be attributed, to a large extent, to the apparent
infringement of such right upon the rights of freedom of speech and
of the press, 2 or to their strict adherence to established precedents
"Supra note 32.
' Supra note 30.
It is interesting to note that in New York, if an express
license or permit had been given, the plaintiff would have been allowed a
recovery, but in this case the court says if an express license had been given,
the fireworks exhibition would then have been under the regulation of the
police, and in such case the municipality would be exercising a governmental
function in which case they were exempt from tort liability.
,Supra notes 45 and 46.
' Infra notes 5 and 6. The following cases have rejected the legal right of
privacy altogether: Vassar College v. Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co., 197 Fed. 982
(W. D. Mo. 1912); Atkinson v. Dougherty, 12 Mich. 372, 80 N. W. 285
(1899); Roberson v. Rochester Folding-Box Co., 171 N. Y. 538, 64 N. E. 442
(1902); Baumann v. Baumann, 250 N. Y. 382, 165 N. E. 819 (1933) ; Somberg
v. Somberg, 263 N. Y. 1, 188 N. E. 152 (1933); Henry v. Cherry, 30 R. I. 13,
73 Atl. 97 (1909); Hillman v. Star Pub. Co., 64 Wash. 691, 117 Pac. 594
(1911) ; see Von Thodorovich v. Franz Josef Ben. Assoc., 154 Fed. 911 (E. D.
Pa. 1907).
'-Roberson v. Rochester Folding-Box Co., supra note 1. But see Pavesich
v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190,.50 S. E. 68 at 74, where Justice
Cobb said: "Liberty of speech and of the press is and has been a useful instrument to keep the individual within the limits of lawful, decent, and proper
conduct; and the right of privacy may well be used within its proper limits to
keep those who speak and write and print within the legitimate bounds of the
constitutional guaranties of such rights; one may be used as a check upon the
other; but neither can be lawfully used for the other's destruction."

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
and principles of jurisprudence.3 However, from a number'of fairly
recent decisions in various jurisdictions, wherein the 'right of privacy
has been recognized either outrightly as an individual right 4 or impliedly, upon a supposed right of property,5 or breach of trust or
contract,6 it may be intimated that the prognosis for the development
of the law of privacy is favorable. And this trend appears more significant, in view of the fact that its existence seems to have been
first asserted in this country so late as the year 1890. 7 The scope of
this article is confined to the development of the law of privacy as
affecting the New York Civil Rights Law, §§50, 51.8
The right of privacy, assuming its existence, has been defined
as the right of an individual to be let alone, 9 or to live without unwarranted invasion by the public in matters of private nature. 10 It
has been sustained by legal writers as a natural right, as being included in an individual's inherent right to life, liberty and pursuit
of happiness."' On that basis, the form of action has been held to
be a personal
one, and being so, to abate with the death of the
12
person.
To understand the nature and extent of this subject, it is necessarily advantageous to make a cursory glance into the growth of legal
and equitable rights. Thus, in the early days, the law gave a remedy
only for the physical interference with life and property. Chancery
was afterwards established to give relief where justice demanded it,
but due to the rigid system of formal actions in the courts of law,
it was there denied. Chancery began treating principally with interests in property, and, from this germinal beginning, sprang up the
common adage that courts of equity will protect property rights only.
In the courts of law, there gradually came a recognition of man's
rights. in his reputation. As a result, there developed the laws of
libel, slander, seduction, malicious prosecution, etc. With the advance
of civilization, the press and other means of communication, together
with the immense progress of human activities, necessity had arisen
to protect a person's feelings, emotions and thoughts. But as formerly said, courts of law had not given recognition to the mental
feelings and anguish of an individual caused by the acts of another;
Roberson v. Rochester Folding-Box Co., supra note 1; Henry v. Cherry,
supra note 1.
'Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., stpra note 2.
'Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S. W. 1076 (1911).
6 Douglas v. Stokes, 149 Ky. 506, 149 S. W. 849 (1912).
"Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy (1890) 4 HARV. L. REV. 193.
The right of privacy, limited as such right must necessarily be, found expression in the laws of France as early as 1868. Id. at 214.
'N. Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW (1903) §§50, 51, amended Laws of 1921, c. 501.
1 COOLEY, TORTS (3d ed. 1906) 33.
1
oPavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., supra note 2, 50 S. E. at 78.
Supra note 7; Kacedan, The Right of Privacy (1932) 12 B. U. L. REV.
600.
353, 'Schuyler
v. Curtis, 147 N. Y. 434, 42 N. E. 22 (1895).
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otherwise
and, even though they were wanton or malicious, yet if 13
lawful, the suffering inflicted was damnum absque injuriaa.
Thus, it is that chancery sensed that the law ought to accord
some remedy against the use of one's personality as early as 1818.14
In that case, Lord Eldon restrained the publication of plaintiff's letters by defendant in protection of the defendant's property in them
as compositions. It is evident that Lord Eldon used the technical
property right to justify equitable intervention in order to protect
the plaintiff's feelings or loss of reputation.
In many jurisdictions, the trend of modern decisions is to follow the case of Gee v. Pritchard. On that basis, in Edison v. Edison
Polyform Mfg. Co.,' 5 the defendant was restrained from an unau.thorized use of the plaintiff's name in advertising and selling a medicine called "Polyform." As in Gee v. Pritchard,the court construed
the highly technical and fictitious property right as an excuse to protect purely personal rights for no injury to plaintiff's business was
involved.
The first of the leading cases to deny the right of a legal right
of privacy where no property right was involved is Roberson v.
Rochester Folding-Box Co. 6 In this case, the Court of Appeals
refused to restrain the publication of the plaintiff's picture for advertising purposes. A7 quotation from that opinion will best explain
the court's attitude:1
"The so-called right of privacy has not yet found an
abiding place in our jurisprudence, and, as we view it, the
doctrine cannot be incorporated without doing violence to settled principles of law by which the profession and the public
have long been guided."
This decision created quite a storm of disapproval among the
profession and the public as evidenced by articles in law journals 18
and other periodicals 19 condemning it. One of the members of the
majority of the court quite unprecedentedly, in view of the harrowing
circumstances, offered a plea of justification for the court's conclusion.20
Shortly after the Roberson decision, the legislature enacted Sections 50, 51 21 to cover the specific case. Thus, one (natural per" Supra note 11; WALSH, A TREATISE ON EQUITY (1930) c. X.
" Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swans. 402, 36 Eng. Rep. 670 (1818).
'
73 N. J. Eq. 136, 67 Atl. 392 (1907).
10

Supra note 1, decided by a bare majority reversing a unanimous decision

of
the Appellate Division, 64 App. Div. 30, 71 N. Y. Supp. 876 (4th Dept.
1901).
0*Id.at 556, 64 N.
E. 447.
"Larremore, The Law of Privacy (1912) 12 COL. L. REv. 693.
Editorial, N. Y. Times, Aug. 23d, 1902.
O'Brien, The Right of Privacy (1902) 2 CoL. L. REv. 437.
" Supra note 8.
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son 22), whose name, picture or portrait is used within the state for
advertising purposes, or purposes of trade, without his written consent first being obtained, may maintain an equitable action to restrain such use and recover damages which may include "smart
money." The statute also makes such violation a misdemeanor.
This act of legislature was held constitutional; it deprives a
person neither of liberty or property without due process of law nor
does it impair the obligation of contract. 23 The right of action under
the statute has been held to be a personal one, and, upon the death
24
of the plaintiff, it does not survive to his executor or administrator.
Cases of significance under the statute are: Almind v. Sea
Beach R. Co.,25 where an injunction was granted restraining a rail-

way from using a picture of the plaintiff and her child, where it is
shown that such picture is used to show defendant's passengers how
to enter and alight from its cars. The court remarked that although
the photograph was not used for trade purposes as no monetary gain
was intended from its exhibition, nevertheless, the statute was technically violated, the picture having been used for purposes of advertising.
The injunctive feature of the act was used in the case of Eliot
v. Jones.26 The plaintiff in this case, president emeritus of Harvard
University, was editing a set of books known as the "Harvard
Classics" and "Dr. Eliot's Five-Foot Shelf of Books." The defendant without the consent of Dr. Eliot published a similar but inferior edition under the name of "Dr. Eliot's Famous Five-Foot
Shelf of the World's Greatest Books." It was held an injunction
was proper.
The inadequacy of the statute was fully illustrated by Moser v.
Press Pub. Co.

27

and Hunviston v. Universal Mfg. Co. 28

These

cases hold to the effect that the publication of a person's photograph
without his consent in a newspaper in connection with news items
or such publication in a newsreel of current events, respectively, is
not such a trade within the contemplation of the legislature in the
passage of Sections 50, 51 of the Civil Rights Law. No doubt the
court, in these cases feared to invade the freedom of the press, but
in view of the express wording of the statute it appears that these
decisions have been wrongly decided.
Rosenwasser v. Ogoglia, 172 App. Div. 107, 158 N. Y. Supp. 56 (2d
Dept. 1916), wherein held that the statute did not apply to a co-partnership.
Rhodes v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 120 App. Div. 467, 104 N. Y. Supp.
102 (2d Dept. 1907); Wyatt v. James McCreery Co., 126 App. Div. 650, 111
N. Y. Supp. 86 (1st Dept. 1908).
'Wyatt v. Hall's Portrait Studio, 71 Misc. 199, 128 N. Y. Supp. 247
(1911).
' 157 App. Div. 230, 141 N. Y. Supp. 842 (2d Dept. 1913).
'66 Misc. 95, 120 N. Y. Supp. 989 (1910).
"59 Misc. 78, 109 N. Y. Supp. 963 (1908).
"189 App. Div. 467, 178 N. Y. Supp. 752 (1919).
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In an article titled, "Right of Privacy," 29 the author very vigorously condemns these decisions since the publication of a newspaper
or a newsreel is concededly for trade purposes. He states in connection with these cases: 30
"As long as they (courts) will continue to interpret this
law not according to what it provides, they will run into contradictions, discrepancies, and absurdities, and the public will
be left without protection against the scurrilous, tabloid journalism and other similar parasites."
In the recent decision of Blumenthal v. Pictures Classics, Inc.,31
it appears, at first glance, that the court reversed its position as far
as newsreel publications are concerned. That case holds to the effect
that an injunction pendente lite is proper where it appears defendant,
without consent or knowledge of plaintiff, distributed and displayed
"motion picture life" showing plaintiff in the act of selling bread and
rolls in a street in New York City. But it is to be noted that the
film was styled by the court as being akin to a feature, which it holds
is within the statute. Nevertheless, the case is of significance to
show the more liberal trend of the court, for it appears that it refused to call the picture a current event newsreel to spare the plaintiff of any feelings of anguish.
Recently, a decision 32 was handed down by the Supreme Court
of New York County on a set of facts which it declared violated the
statute. The decision is interesting since the Supreme Court of
Kings County, on a similar set of facts,33 dismissed the complaint.
The facts of the Garden case are: 34 The plaintiff granted to the
predecessor of the defendant perfume company, which grant was
given in writing, the right to use her name and portrait for an unlimited time in advertising its wares. The defendant trademarked
the articles with which plaintiff's name was associated and spent
considerable money to popularize them. After a lapse of a number
of years, plaintiff brought action under Sections 50, 51 of the Civil
Rights Law to restrain defendant from using her name and portrait
in connection with their business.
In the Wendel case,35 the plaintiff, while an employee in the
defendant company, posed voluntarily for a portrait to be used in
connection with his master's business. At the termination of his
employment, he sued defendant under the statute.
Kacedan, Thw Right of Privacy, supra note 11.
Id. at 645.
a1235 App. Div. 570, 257 N. Y. Supp. 800 (1st Dept. 1932).
' Garden v. Parfumerie Rigaud, Inc., 151 Misc. 692 (1934).
'Wendell v. Conduit Mach. Co., 74 Misc. 201, 133 N. Y. Supp. 758 (1911).
",Supra note 31.

' Supra note 32.
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In both cases it is to be noted the consent was given gratuitously; furthermore, in the Garden case, the consent was in writing.
In the Wendel case, the defendant was estopped from obtaining
an injunction, the court therein remarking: 36
"The application for an injunction is governed by the
use of equitable rules, and the relief will be denied him, even
though he shows he has a right and would otherwise be entitled to the remedy, in cases he has himself acted dishonestly,
fraudulently or illegally."
But note the words of the court in the Garden case:

3T

"It is the well settled law of this state that a gratuitous
license-and that is the best that can be said of the permission granted by plaintiff-to use name and portrait is -revocable
at any time, even though action has been taken on it. The
court cannot lend itself to defendant's claim that having trademarked the article and invested considerable money to popularize it, no revocation is possible.
"*

* * Even admitting that her (plaintiff's)

reason is

ulterior and mercenary, it cannot be denied that her name and
portrait are her own and during life at her disposal."
Clearly, in the Garden case, the court could have considered
either waiver 38 or estoppel.3 9 Or else, it could have literally construed the statute and found that defendant had adhered to the statutory provisions.
It is the writer's opinion, in view of this decision and that of
the Blumenthal case, 40 the courts have manifested a desire to preserve
an individual's right of privacy wherever it can do so without violating the doctrine of stare decisis. It is in furtherance of the major
trend to regard the right of privacy in the nature of a natural and
inviolable right guaranteed by the Constitution. However, from the
Baurnann4' and Somberg 42 decisions, wherein the right of an indi-

vidual right of privacy was again denied to the plaintiff, it appears
that the New York courts will not for some time follow the case of
Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co. 43 This view is to be regretted.
Supra note 33, at 203, 133 N. Y. Supp. at 759.
Supra note 31, at 693.
Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., supra note 2; Munden v. Harris,
supra note 5.
Supra note 32.
4 Supra note 30.
"Baumann v. Baumann, supra note 1.
• Somberg v. Somberg, supra note 1.
4 Supra note 2.
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The experience with the Civil Rights Law 44 has taught us that the
statutory enactments to protect a person's right of privacy are inadequate in dealing with the innumerable situations which may arise
in this field.
It may be argued that legal or equitable acts against immoral
conduct will open a wide field of possible litigation with ineffective
results. 45 But is it not a truism of jurisprudence that the difficulty
of practical administration in certain cases is not a valid objection
to the recognition of legal principles? 46 Actually, such actions would
be little, if any, more speculative than is the criterion of negligence
which is constantly applied to concrete facts by juries.
Messrs. Warren and Brandeis, realizing that the relief, if it is
to be given under the right of privacy, must be controlled to be
effective, have outlined the limitation. This has received the approval of subsequent articles on the subject.47 The scope as stated
by the authors are: 48
"1. The right of privacy does not prohibit any publication of matter which is of public or general interest.
2. The right of privacy does not prohibit ,the communication of any matter, though in its nature private, when the
publication is made under circumstances which would render
it a privileged communication according to the laws of libel
and slander.
3. The law would not probably grant any redress for
invasion of privacy by oral publication in the absence of special damage.
4. The right to privacy ceases upon the publication of
the facts by the individual, or with his consent.
5.

The truth of the matter does not afford a defense.
6. The absence of 'malice' in the publisher does not
afford a defence."
Three sorts of remedies exist, namely, money damages, equitable
injunction and penal liability. No doubt, the principal brunt of the
litigation will be borne by the courts of equity. In his dissenting
opinion in the Roberson case,'49 judge Gray remarks that the peculiar
"Supra note 8.
(1934) 8 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 359.
"Kujek v. Goldman, 150 N. Y. 176, 44 N. E. 773 (1896).
' Larremore, The Law of Privacy, supra note 18; supra note 28.
,sSupra note 7, at 214.

Roberson v. Rochester Folding-Box Co., supra note 1, at 562, 64 N. E.
at 450.
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preventive power of a court of equity is a proper remedy for effectuating the rights of privacy. Moreover, equity is capable of granting
relief in the average case awarding damages as incidental to an
,injunction.
In summation, it may be stated that the development of the law
of privacy in various jurisdictions is favorable. The right of an individual to be let alone, or to live without unwarranted invasion by
the public in matters of private nature has become more increasingly
apparent during the last two decades. This view is evidenced by
holdings in certain jurisdictions wherein the right of privacy has
already received cognizance either as an individual 50 or property
right. 51 However, New York courts have been very conservative
in the past, holding steadfastly to the common law rule. With the
exception of the statute, 52 they deny the legal existence of such
right; and in view of the recent holdings of the Baumann 53 and
Somberg 54 cases, it is seemingly evident that they will not for some
time give recognition to the right of privacy as a common law right.
But it is interesting to note that, of late years, they have more liberally construed the statute. It is some evidence that New York will
subsequently follow the Georgian decision 55 either through judicial
decision or further legislative enactment.
ALEXANDER

A. MERSACK.

RIGHT OF ACTION OF THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARIES UNDER

THE

N. I. R. A.
In the recently decided case of Canton v. The Palms, Inc.,' decided in the City Court of Buffalo, N. Y., an action involving the
construction and application of the President's Reemployment Agreement and the Restaurant Industry Basic Code, approved by the
N. R. A., it was held that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover the
difference between wages paid under the contract of employment,
and the minimum wage clause, as embodied in the Restaurant Industry Basic Code.
In line with the general tendency to effectuate the purposes of
the N. I. R. A. this case was decided on the traditional doctrines of
contract. In interpreting the President's Reemployment Agreement,
' Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., supra note 2.
' Supra note 5.
' Supra note 21.
'Baumann v. Baumann, supra note 1.
" Somberg v. Somberg, supra note 1.
Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., supra note 2.
' 152 Misc. 347, 273 N. Y. Supp. 239 (1934).

